For example, Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) Kagel and Levin (1993) and Harstad (2000) . Garratt, Walker and Wooders (2011) show that even eBay sellers, who have substantial prior experience with auctions in the field don't bid their value.
1 Similar violations have been documented in other environments such as one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods games (Dawes 1980; Dawes and Thaler 1988; Attiyeh 2000) , School Choice (Chen and Sönmez 2006; Fack et al. 2015; Ding and Schotter 2015; Hassidim et al. 2016 Hassidim et al. , 2017 , Matching
Program (Rees-Jone 2016), Voting (Esponda and Vespa 2014) and in the choice of Health Insurance (Bhargava et al 2015) . Being the best response under any subjective beliefs implies that its violation cannot be explained by models that relax beliefs in equilibrium, such as Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium (Jehiel 2005) , Levelk Wilson 1994, 1995; Nagel 1995; Crawford and Iriberri 2007) and Cursed Equilibrium (Eyster and Ragin 2005) .
Several behavioral models use non-standard preferences, such as, Joys of Wining (Harrison 1989) or Spite motives (Morgan et al. 2003) to explain overbidding in private-value, Second-Price auctions. 2 However, Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) also find a quick convergence to the DS in the strategically equivalent English auction, raising the question, "Where have all the joys or spites gone in English auctions?" Thus, a non-ad-hoc theoretical explanation to this robust experimental finding is still absent. 1 Different from novice subjects in earlier experiments, they exhibited no greater tendency to overbid than to underbid.
2 Other-regarding Preferences (e.g., Cooper and Kagel 2009 ) such as altruism and inequality aversion, which were originally developed to explain the emergence of cooperation (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) , may be used to justify underbidding in auctions. Anticipated Regret (Filiz-Ozbay 2007; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 2007) , another non-standard preference model proposed to explain overbidding in First Price auctions cannot account for the insincere bidding in private-value Second Price auctions, since bidding one's value is a DS 3 Harstad (2000) shows that a framing effect alone cannot explain the superior performance of English auctions.
In a recent insightful paper, Li (2017) introduces Obviously Strategy-Proof (OSP) mechanisms implemented by a stronger solution concept than DS, the obviously dominant strategy (ODS). Li's OSP mechanisms are a subset of DS mechanisms and can explain why OSP mechanisms (e.g., English auctions) can outperform "just" DS mechanisms (e.g., Second-Price auctions), while keeping the framework of standard game theory.
However, dominant strategy is optimal regardless of the players', objective or subjective beliefs. Therefore, spotting DS does not require strategic thinking often required in games, reducing the task to optimization in individual decision making, which suggests that such deviations from available DS involve deeper violations of axioms in decision theory. 4 On the other hand, the superior performance of ODS may imply players' compliance with weaker axioms.
Our proposed model uses weaker axioms than those used before, and is motivated, in part, by making a psychological observation: decision makers' inability to envision all hypothetical scenarios and reason state-by-state, which is essential in spotting a DS, but not an ODS. Thus, deviations from the DS in all aforementioned environments and convergences in the others are explained by such a deficiency. 5 We formalize the deficiency by proposing Partition Obvious Preference (POP) using weaker axioms where a decision maker reasons by partitioning the state-space into events. The decision maker can reason event-byevent, but not state-by-state within each event. The coarser the partition, the more bounded rational the decision maker will be. We illustrate reasoning by partitions and why it matters by the following two examples. 4 The decision maker who satisfies the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility Theory (Savage 1954; Anscombe and Autumn 1963; Fishburn 1970) , or even weaker axioms proposed in Ambiguity models (Schmeidler and Gilboa 1989; Gilboa and Marinacci 2011) , ought to adopt DS when it is available, due to the monotonicity axiom. 5 Such deficiency in contingent reasoning is supported by the psychology literature about the presence of Disjunction Effect (Shafir and Tversky, 1992) and findings in laboratory experiments (Charness and Levin 2009; Esponda and Vespa 2014; Levin et al. 2016 ).
Example 1: Consider decision problems in Figure 1 with Problem 1 on the left and Problem 2 on the right. Suppose there are two possible states, L and R; the decision maker has two available actions, U and D; and payoffs are given in the matrices. There are only two possible partitions, the finest {L, R} shown on the Top and the coarsest {(L, R)} on the bottom. Given the finest partition, any POP prefers U to D in both Problems 1 and 2, since the payoff of U is higher than that of D in any state. Given the coarsest partition, any POP prefers U to D in Problem 2, since any possible payoff of U (5, 4) is higher than that of D (2, 3). However, POP also allows the decision maker to prefer D to U in Problem 1 because some payoff of D (4) is better than one payoff of U (3). Note that U is an ODS in Problem 2, but just a DS in Problem 1. Thus, when there are only two states, the implication of our approach degenerates to that of Li's (2016) . payoffs are given in the corresponding matrices. Given the finest partition, any POP prefers D to U in both Problems 3 and 4, since the payoff of D is higher than that of U in any state. In contrast, given the coarsest partition, POP also allows the decision maker to prefer U to D in both Problems 3 and 4, since we can find one payoff of U higher than that of D. Alternatively, consider the partition, {ℬ 1 , ℬ 2 },
where ℬ 1 = { 1 , 2 } and ℬ 2 = { 3 , 4 }; any POP prefers D to U in Problem 3, 4/12/17 since in either event 1 or 2 , any payoff of D is higher than that of U. However, POP allows the decision maker to prefer U to D because in either 1 or 2 , some payoff of U is higher than that of D.
FIGURE 2. AN EXAMPLE OF FOUR STATES
We develop Partition Obvious Preference Theorem, which subsumes the Subjective Expected Utility Theorem as an extreme case when the partition is the finest. Specifically, we envision that decision makers partition the state space into events, where for each event, they value each act as the weighted average of the most and least preferred outcomes, then form subjective expected probabilities over the partition, and choose the action that gives the highest subjective expected utility.
We extend our approach to games by defining partition dominant strategy, where at one polar case, when the partition is the finest, the partition dominant strategy coincides with the DS, and at the other, when the partition is the coarsest, it coincides with Li's ODS. We show that a strategy is partition dominant, if and only if any POP prefers it to any deviating strategy at any reachable information set.
Our theory has three implications for mechanism design. First, when an implementation in ODS does not exist, 6 the designer may still find an implementation using our new solution concept that is stronger than DS, i.e., with a partition coarser than the finest. We show further that as the state space becomes 6 An implementation in obvious dominant strategy rarely exists. Li (2016) proves that no top trading cycle rule with more than three agents can be implemented by an obviously dominant strategy. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2016) show that for general preferences, no mechanism that implements a stable matching is obviously strategy-proof. Pycia (2017) finds that Random Priority is the unique mechanism that is obviously strategy-proof, ex-post Pareto efficient, and symmetric. Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) characterize a similar limitation in applications of obviously strategy-proof mechanisms in dictatorship mechanisms, house matching and multi-unit auctions. larger, our "intermediate" solution concept grows in usefulness relative to the ODS.
Second, when a DS is also partition dominant with respect to a coarser partition, the mechanism designer might be able to highlight that partition by a proper presentation and achieve a desirable outcome, not requiring people to reason in the finest partition. 7 Third, our work provides plausible explanations for the experimental observation that often, a dynamic mechanism performs better than its strategically equivalent static mechanism. A dynamic design enlarges (often strictly) the set of partitions so that the dominant strategy is also partition dominant. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we present our Partition Obvious
Preference Theorem, and we give three examples to illustrate how it works. In Section 2, we extend our results to games, define partition dominant strategy and partition obvious equilibrium, and discuss its applications to mechanism design. In Section 3, we describe our experimental design and analyze the results. We discuss additional related literature, future research, and conclude in Section 5.
I. Partition Obvious Preference
Denote by a set of deterministic outcomes and by a set of distributions over with finite supports, i.e., is a collection of random outcomes. Let Ω denote the state space of all states, , ∈ Ω, and let ℱ denote the set of all acts, : Ω → .
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For simplicity, we assume that Ω is finite. Denote by ( ) the set of all possible random outcomes given act , and by ℱ the set of constant acts in ℱ.
A. The Axioms
The first two axioms are standard in decision theory. 
The partition monotonicity requires the decision maker to compare outcomes of two acts event-by-event, but not state-by-state within each event of the partition, as in the standard monotonicity axiom.
The following definition of mixed acts is standard in the literature.
Definition 2. (mixed acts) for any , ℎ ∈ ℱ , ∈ [0,1] , and ∈ Ω , [ + The next two axioms generalize the continuity and independence axioms by imposing them on mixed acts of only partition measurable acts.
Axiom 4. (partition continuity) for any act ∈ ℱ and any two acts , ℎ ∈ ℱ (Σ)
such that ≻ ≻ ℎ, there are , ∈ (0,1) such that
Axiom 5. (partition independence) for any three acts , , ℎ ∈ ℱ (Σ) and any
Hence, partition continuity and partition independence are analogous to the continuity and independence axioms without request the decision maker to reason in an even finer partition. 
That is, for all , ∈ ℱ, ≿ if and only if ( ) ≿ ( ).
Furthermore:
(a) The function in (ii) is unique up to positive affine transformation;
(b)The probability function is unique;
(c) is unique on ℱ with the exclusion of ℱ (Σ).
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PROOF. See Appendix A.1.
C. Illustrative Examples
Example 3. Consider the following voting problem from experiments reported in Esponda and Vespa (2014) . There is an urn with 5 red balls and 5 blue balls. One ball is randomly drawn and selected. Two computers "observe" the color of the selected ball and are programmed to vote by the same rule: if the selected ball is red, vote red; otherwise, vote blue or red with equal probability (1/2). The human subject must vote for either red or blue without observing the color of the selected ball. If the color chosen by a simple majority matches the color of the selected ball, the subject wins $2; otherwise, her payoff is $0. In Treatment A, subjects vote without any information about the actual votes of the computers. In Treatment B, the subjects know the votes of the two computers before casting her vote. In Treatment B, we only consider the case where the two computers vote differently; otherwise, the subject's decision does not affect the outcome. Thus, it is not clear what a vote implies. Voting blue is a weakly dominant choice in both treatments.
However, Esponda and Vespa (2014) observed that more than half of the subjects 9 For any in ℱ (Σ), all ( ) ∈ [0,1] end up with the same ( ).
voted red in Treatment A even after repetitions with feedbacks. In contrast, in Treatment B, the subjects converged quickly to voting blue, even without feedback.
Denote each state by = ( , ). Now consider the partition by the votes of computer presented by two tables in Figure 4 . There are three possible cases: A, B, and C. The computer randomly draws one case, which is unknown to both players, each with a probability of 1/3. Each player chooses between R and L and the payoff table is shown in three matrices. Each decision maker is randomly matched with a player who is drawn from the pool of subjects who played the same game in pairs. The payoff of the decision maker thus depends on his choice, the case he is in, and the strategy chosen by his opponent in the past. The state space in this decision problem is a cross product of cases {A, B, C} and choices of the other player {L, R}. Given each case (A, B, or C) and each strategy of the opponent (R or L), choosing R always generates a higher payoff.
Thus, any subjective utility maximizer would not be willing to pay for the noninstrumental 10 information notifying which case they are in, at a positive price. ) that the information of cases can vary optimal decisions for POP. See Appendix A.5 for details.
( | ) < ( | ) but ( ) > ( ), the information regarding which case the decision maker is in can alter the optimal choice and thus it is instrumental for the bounded rational player we characterize. This example alerts us to the fact that noninstrumental information in theory might nevertheless be instrumental for bounded rational players, e.g., POP with a coarser partition.
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The partition in our theorem is given exogenously. A natural question is: does there always exist a unique finest partition that can rationalize some POP? However, uniqueness is not guaranteed at least when the state space is finite.
Reconsider Problem 4 of Example 2 in the introduction in Figure 5 . The choice of U can be rationalized by Σ = {ℬ 1 , ℬ 2 }, where ℬ 1 = { 1 , 2 }, ℬ 2 = { 3 , 4 }; and
However, it cannot be rationalized by their joint, the coarsest common refinement: 
II. Partition Dominant Strategy
We extend our concept to dynamic games. We introduce the decision environment in dynamic games in Subsection A. We propose partition dominant strategy and relate it to POP in Subsection B. In Subsection C, we discuss the application of partition dominant strategy to mechanism design. 12 Zhang (2017) designed an experiment to compare the subjects' demand for extra information when there is either just a DS or an ODS, and to explore how the behavioral difference across subjects are related to their performance on three cognitive tests of contingent reasoning and SAT scores.
A. The Decision Environment in a Dynamic Game
We consider the extensive game form 13 Γ with imperfect information and perfect recall as defined in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) . Denote the set of strategy profiles by = × − and the set of nature's moves by Ω = { }. The domain of Player 's uncertainty consists of moves of nature Ω and the strategy of other players − . So, let Ω = − × Ω denote the subjective state space of player i.
14 At each terminal history, ℎ = ( , − , ), Player i is assigned a deterministic or random outcome in a set defined in Section I. Thus, Player 's preference over her own strategy set is characterized by a preference relation ≿ on the set of acts :
Ω → . The utility of Player i at each terminal history, ( , − , ), is thus determined by the utility function of lotteries in Theorem 1, :
For any information set Ι ∈ ℐ, denote by ( ) the set of strategy profiles that reach I. 15 The projections of ( ) on and − are denoted by ( ) and − ( ); perfect recall implies that ( ) = ( )× − ( ), and the set of available strategies
for Player i at information set I is ( ). Player i who chooses an action ∈ ( ) at information set I, must restrict herself to a smaller set of strategies denoted by
set of strategies from which the player is deviating by choosing .
13 An extensive game form is a tuple Γ = {N, Υ}, where N is the set of players and Υ is the game tree.
14 Bayesian Models in decision theory under uncertainty Savage (1954) and Solution Concepts in game theory (Nash 1950 ) originated independently. Aumann (1987) synthesizes the two viewpoints by Correlated Equilibrium. In his set-up, the state of the world in games is a specification of which strategy is chosen by each player. Esponda (2013) further defines the state space as the product of the strategy sets and the set of fundamentals to include both strategic and structural uncertainty. He further develops the Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium by adding certain restrictions to each player's beliefs over states of the world in equilibrium. Siniscalchi (2016a Siniscalchi ( , 2016b Siniscalchi ( , 2016c ) adopts a similar definition of the subjective state space in dynamic games in three of his recent works about structural rationality. 15 Formally, ( ) = { ∈ | ℎ ℎ ∈ ∈ Ω ℎ ℎ ℎ ℎ ( , )} Upon reaching an information set Ι ∈ ℐ , Player i must rule out moves of nature and strategies of other players that do not allow reaching information set I. We denote the conditioning event at information set I by [I] , at which is reachable.
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Finally, denote by ℐ( ) = [ ∈ ℐ| ∈ ( )], the set of information sets that is reachable by strategy .
B. Partition Dominant Strategy
Definition 5. (conditional partition-system) A conditional partition-system Σ for Player in a dynamic Game G is a collection of partitions, {Σ( )} ∈ℐ ∪∅ , such
Definition 6. (partition dominant strategy) In a dynamic Game G, a strategy * is a Σ-dominant strategy for Player , if for any information set, ∈ ℐ( * ), any nonempty event, ℬ( ) ∈ Σ( ) and any deviating strategy,
Remark: When the partition is the coarsest, Σ = {Ω } , -dominant strategy coincides with Li's (2016) 16 Formally, [I]= {( − , ) ∈ | ℎ ℎ ∈ , ∈ such that h is a sub-history of ( , − , )}. 17 Li (2016, Def. 4) defines dominant strategy in a slightly different way. Note that, in our paper, nature's moves Ω include both the chance moves and type randomizations in Li's. Li defines a strategy as weekly dominant if its expected payoff with respect to chance moves is not smaller than that of any alternative strategy for any realized type. Our notion of (4)
Lemma 1. When the Partition Σ is the finest, Definitions 6 and 7 are equivalent.
PROOF: See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1. In a dynamic Game G, a strategy * is an Σ-dominant strategy for
Player i if and only if for any Σ-Obvious Preference ≿, satisfies the following:
PROOF: See Appendix A.3.
So, a strategy is Σ-dominant if and only if any Σ-Obvious Preference prefers it to any deviating strategy at any reachable information set. Hence, mechanisms with a strategy that is partition dominant in a coarser partition work for a larger set of preferences.
C. Applications to Mechanism Design
Our theory has three implications for mechanism design. First, if an implementation in ODS does not exist, we may still find an implementation in partition dominant strategy, a solution concept stronger than DS, with a partition that is coarser than the finest. We show by Example 5 that the usefulness of our is obviously dominant in the former, but not in the latter case. However, as there dominance is stronger than Li's, since our dominant strategy needs to be ex-post optimal, not only expected, given any realization of chance moves. However, Li's Theorem 1 still holds even if he instead used our notion.
are only two possible partitions, our "intermediate" concept is not applicable. Now with = 3, ( ) = 0, 1, 2, 3. is not obviously dominant in cases where ( ) > 0. However, we can still find a partition coarser than the finest so that is partition dominant when ( ) = 1, 2. With = , ( ) = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
obviously dominant for ( ) > 0, but we can still find a partition coarser than the finest so that is partition dominant when ( ) = 1,2, … ,
Second, when a strategy is partition dominant, we may be able to highlight the partition by a proper presentation and achieve a more desirable outcome. Third, in general, a dynamic mechanism tends to perform better than its strategically equivalent static mechanism because as more information arrives and fewer possible states are left, inferior and less attractive alternative strategies are dismissed as their inferiority becomes clearer, and makes the desired choice more obvious. 18 Specifically, following from Definition 6, if a strategy is -dominant in a static game, then it is also -dominant in its strategically equivalent dynamic games, but not vice versa. In other words, the dynamic variation weakly, and at times strictly, enlarges the set of partitions that makes the dominance obvious and thus help a subject who reasons in coarser partitions. For example, like Li's (2016) theory, our theory predicts more sincere bidding in English auctions that is ODS, than in the SPSB auctions that is "just" DS.
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FIGURE 7. SPSB AUCTION Example 7. In a SPSB auction, denote by ( ) = as bidding one's value and by ′( ) = + as overbidding by > 0. As shown in Figure 7 , upon choosing either strategy, the only case bidder i wins the auction with positive payoff is when the highest bid of other bidders, denoted by − , is lower than . Given the finest partition, one ought to realize that any amount of positive payoff would happen with the same probability, regardless of whether one bids or + . However, by a coarser partition, the bidder is allowed to think that overbidding would increase the probability of winning and thus increase the expected payoff. For example, with
18 So, what matters the most is not the dynamic itself but the information updating and sequential choices allowed by it. For example, Kagel and Levin (2009) document the superior performance of a dynamic Ausubel auction with drop-out information over both the static Vickrey auction and the dynamic auction without dropout information. 19 In auctions with lottery prizes, Karni and Safra (1989) find that weaker assumptions are needed for sincere bidding to be optimal in English than in SPSB auctions, but they focuse on weakening the axioms of risk preferences. the partition { < − < + , + < − < } , consider a POP that assigns ′ = 1 to ′( ) = + and = 0 to ( ) = . Then ( ) = 0 < ( ′ ). Such a POP will prefer to overbid although it is a dominated strategy.
However, in an English auction, any POP prefers sincere bidding.
Our theory also accounts for the superior performance of a dynamic Ausubel (2004) auction with a multiple-unit demand over its static implementation (Vickrey 1961 ), a phenomenon documented in the experiment by Kagel and Levin (2009) .
In brief, when we restrict the strategy set to cut-off strategies, the Ausubel auction is strategically equivalent with Vickrey auction. 20 However, there exist partitions, by the "clinching price", coined by Ausubel, so that sincere bidding is partition dominant in the Ausubel auction, but not in the Vickrey auction. We provide a detailed argument in Appendix A.4. Elmes and Reny (1994) prove that if two finite extensive form games with perfect recall share the same normal form, then we can get one game from another by three kinds of transformations in finite steps. It raises the questions: why in general, among two games that share the same normal form, one has a certain partition dominant strategy but the other does not; which transformation breaks the nice property of partition dominance. We show by the following example that one of their transformation, called "ADD," is critical for answering this question.
Example 8: In Figure 8 , we get extensive form Game B from Game A by Elmes and Reny's "ADD" transformation. 21 Clearly, the two games share the same normal 20 If we consider a larger set of strategies, where one bidder's active units of demand can depend on not only the clock price, but also on other bidders' active units of demand, then in the Ausubel auction with dropout information, sincere bidding is not even a dominant strategy (see Ausubel 2004) . However, we argue that to consider such strategies, it also requires higher cognitive ability because bidders need to consider more contingencies. The bottom line is: once we allow the bounded rationality of contingent reasoning, our theory can resolve the discrepancy between the theory and experimental evidence: Ausubel auctions with feedback perform better than Vickrey's, not as a weaker solution concept, but a stronger solution concept. 21 See Page 12 of Elmes and Reny's paper for the definition of "ADD" transformation.
form. Partitioning by moves of nature, L is a partition dominant strategy for Player 2 in Game A but not in Game B. (5)
Since any equilibrium payoff can be viewed as a constant act, a strategy profile is an Σ-Equilibrium if and only if any Σ-Obvious Preference prefers any realized equilibrium payoff to any deviating strategy at any reachable information set conditioning on the event that contains the realized state. 23 When the partition is the finest Σ = Ω , Σ-Equilibrium coincides with Ex-post Equilibrium, and when the partition is the coarsest Σ = {Ω} , it coincides with Obvious Nash Equilibrium 22 That is, if the state of the world is ω, then the player is informed of the element ε(ω) of Σ that contains ω. (2017)'s ODS concept do not suggest any performance difference between both mechanisms. We study whether subjects play the DS at higher rates when it is also partition dominant. In addition, all subjects also participate in an individual decision task, where the optimal choice is either partition dominant or not. This will allow us to investigate whether the subjects' behavior in games is consistent with their non-strategic choices.
A. Experiment Design
Random Serial Dictatorship. Consider the following variation of the random serial dictatorship experiment in Li (2017) . The subjects are randomly assigned into a group of four, and each of them may receive one of four money prizes. There are two cases, L and R. Each group will be either in Case L or R, selected with a probability of ½, but the groups will not know to which of these two cases they are assigned. The total value of prizes for a group is = 10 in Case L and = 22.5
in Case R. In both cases, four prize values are drawn uniformly at random and 25 In the scenario of single-object auctions, Li (2017b) proposes Obvious Auctions that achieve efficiency with his
Obvious Ex-post Equilibrium.
without replacement, from the set {0.1 , 0.2 , 0.3 , 0.4 }, where T is the total value.
At the start of each game, the subjects observe the value of four prizes in both Cases L and R. They are also assigned and informed of a priority score, which is drawn uniformly from integers 1 to 10. There are two games, S and D.
In Game S, each player is asked simultaneously to submit a list that ranks her preferences over the four prizes. The players are then processed sequentially, from the highest to the lowest priority score. Ties in priority score are broken randomly.
Each player is assigned the highest-ranked prize on her list among the prizes that
have not yet been assigned to players with higher priorities who selected earlier.
In Game D, the players take turns to select a prize in order of their priority score, from the highest to the lowest. When a player takes her turn, she is shown the prizes that have not yet been taken and is asked to pick one of them.
In both games, the players are paid the monetary value of the prize assigned based A subject is randomly assigned, with a probability of ½, to Case L or Case R, but they will not be informed whether they are in Case L or Case R. There are two decision tasks, S and D. The subjects' payoff depends on the case they are in, and on their choices.
In Decision S, the subject is asked to first choose one of the stickers, and then pick one box with unknown value. Then the subject sees the monetary value in the box she picks.
In Decision D, the subject is asked to first pick one box. And then is shown the monetary value inside the box. Then she is asked to choose a sticker.
In both decision tasks, S and D, if the case is L, the subject is assigned the lower monetary value between the one in the box and the one on the sticker; if the case is R, the subject is assigned the higher monetary value between these two. Picking a sticker with a monetary value other than the highest possible, 10, is a dominated strategy (/choice), 26 but not an ODS in both tasks. 27 Again, neither the standard game theory nor Li's approach would suggest behavioral difference between the two tasks, but in contrast our approach does. Consider the partition by Case L and Case R. Picking a sticker with a prize of 10 is a partition dominant strategy in Decision D but not in Decision S. 28 Thus, Our POP predicts more choices of stickers with a prize of 10 in Decision D than in Decision S.
B. Treatments
We adopt a crossover design (Piantadosi 2005) as shown in Table 1 below. The treatments are across subjects. Each treatment consists of 4 tasks, Game S, Game 26 They are dominated by picking the prize of 10 and the same box.
27 For example, the highest prize the subject can get by picking a sticker with 8 on it, is 10. It is higher than the lowest prize the subject can get by picking a sticker with 10, which is 0. 28 In Decision D, after the subject see the value inside the box (x ≤ 10): in Case L, the lowest prize by picking a sticker with 10 on it is x; the highest prize by picking a sticker with any other value is at most x. In Case R, the lowest prize by picking a sticker with 10 on it is 10; the highest prize by picking a sticker with any other value is at most 10. Thus, picking a sticker with 10 on it is obviously dominant in both cases. The argument does not follow in Decision S. For example, in Case L, the lowest prize by picking a sticker with 10 is 0, lower than the highest prize of picking 8 (that is 8).
D, Decision S and Decision D, and each task will repeatedly be played for 10 rounds. 29 In Treatment 1, the subjects first play 10 rounds of Game S followed by 10 rounds of Game D, and then Decision S for the first 10 rounds, followed by 10 rounds of Decision D. In Treatment 2, the order is reversed. The instructions for each task are given immediately before that task. There is no information feedback until the end of the experiment. At the start of each game of the experiment, the subjects are randomly assigned into groups of four. These groups persist throughout the experiment. Consequently, each group's play can be regarded as a single independent observation in the statistical analysis. Our design allows us to compare each subject's behavior in Game (Decision) S with those in Game (Decision) D, controlling for sequential order effects. Moreover, using the data for only the 1 st game and decision tasks in both treatments, we are also able to compare across subjects how players behave differently in Game (Decision) S and Game (Decision) D. 
C. Administrative Detail
The subjects were paid $5 for participating in the experiment, in addition to their profits or losses from every round of the experiment. On average, they received a total of $16.19, including the participation payment.
We conducted the experiment in January 2017 at the Ohio State University Experimental Economics Laboratory, using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) . We 29 In each task, at the end of Round 10, we randomly select a round and add to the subjects' earnings the payment they receive in that round. Azrieli, Chambers and Healy (2016) prove that such random problem section mechanism is the only incentive compatible mechanism assuming monotonicity.
recruited subjects from the student population using the ORSEE online recruiting system. We administrated 7 sessions, where each session involved 3-5 groups. Each session lasted about 60 minutes. The data was collected from a total of 108 subjects in 27 groups of 4, with 13 groups in Treatment 1 and 14 groups in Treatment 2.
48% of subjects are female and 52% are male.
D. Result
To compare the subjects' behavior in Game S to their behavior in Game D, we report the proportions, in the pooled data, of the games that do not end in the DS outcome. In Game S, 36.58% of the games did not end in the DS outcome, where in Game D this percentage is just 3.33%. Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the empirical frequency of non-DS outcomes by Games and by 5-round blocks, in the pooled data, the within-subject, and the cross-subject comparison. Deviations from the DS outcome happen almost 10 times more frequently in Game S than in Game D, and these differences are highly significant in both early and late rounds of the pooled data, the within-subject, and the cross-subject comparison. In Game S, 31.85% of the submitted erroneous rank-order lists, and in Game D, this percentage is just 1.11%. To compare subject behavior in Decision S and Decision D, we display the proportion of dominated choice. In Decision S of the pooled data, 23.80% of choices are dominated strategies. In Decision D of the pooled data, 0.83% of choices are dominated strategies. Tables 5, 6 and 7 report the empirical frequency of dominated choice, by Decision Tasks and by 5-round blocks, in the pooled data, the within-subject, and the cross-subject comparison. Dominated choice happens more frequently in Decision S than in Decision D, and these differences are highly significant in both early and late rounds of the pooled data, the within-subject and the cross-subject comparison. In summary, subjects play the dominant strategy at much higher rates in mechanisms with partition dominant strategies, as compared to dominant strategy mechanisms that should implement the same allocation rule. Moreover, subjects choose dominated strategy at much lower rate in decision tasks when the optimal choice is also partition dominant than when it is not. In Appendix B, we display alternative statistical analyses that yield similar results. We also found a significant negative correlation between the priority score and the deviation from dominant strategies in Game S. 31 See Appendix B online for details. 32 31 Hassidim, Romm and Shorrer (2016) also find negative correlation between the priority score and the deviation from the dominant strategy in Serial Random Dictatorship by revisiting data from one of the treatments in Li's (2017) experiment. 32 As a side result, we found that women are more likely to choose dominated strategies in both Game and Decision S.
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But we are aware that the gender difference we found might be due to other correlated factors, which is beyond the scope of the current paper. (Allais 1953) , several theories were introduced as alternatives. Prominent in those are Rank-dependent utility models (Quiggin 1982; Yaari 1987; Hong et al. 1987 ); Green and Jullien 1989)), Betweenness Conforming theories (Chew and MacCrimmon 1979; Fishburn 1983; Dekel 1986; Gul 1991) , Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and Regret Theories (Bell 1982; Loomes 1982 sticker. Next, subjects are asked to place the sticker on one face of a six-face standard die and roll it. The participants win that prize only if the die falls with the sticker faces up. Selecting any other prize than 23 is dominated, since the participant could put the prize of 23 on the same face as the other prize she considers. However, 31% of the subjects did not choose the prize of 23 in the experiment. Arad argues that those subjects are affected by magical thinking:
greediness or tempting-fate would increase the likelihood of adverse outcomes.
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Such behavior can also be captured by POP preference that assign a larger or a higher subjective probability of winning the prize by choosing a lower prize (being less greedy). 38 Explanations such as reason-based choice, magical thinking as well as joys of winning, spite-motive, and inequality aversion offer specific explanations in specific environments for DS violations. Our approach provides a more unified theoretical foundation. It thus also serves to bridge the gulf between the rational and the psychological narratives.
The general idea that a decision maker has a coarse vision of the state-space appears in research in psychology (see e.g., Tversky and Koehler 1994) , ambiguity and non-additive probabilities (Schmeidler 1989; Epstein et al. 2007; Ghirardato 2001; Mukerji 1997; Ahn and Ergin 2010) , formation of subjective state-space (Dekel et al. 2001) , and growing awareness (Karni and Marie-Louise 2013) .
However, these papers mainly focus on the formation of subjective probabilities over the state-space, while ours first proposes a weakening of the monotonicity axiom based on such a coarser understanding of the state-space.
37 Using the magical concerns of punishment for greediness to explain the choice of dominated strategies dates to the Newcomb paradox (Nozick, 1969) . 38 As in Ozdenoren and Peck (2008) , the decision maker may behave as if playing "against" the less than benevolent nature and think their choices may affect nature's move as in a sequential game.
Our POP can also be interpreted from the perspective of procedural rationality, similar to, but richer than, how Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) (Simon 1976 ) right away, optimizing given a belief over the state-space, they adopt the following procedure: They first associate one outcome with each of their actions, in each event of the partition, by sampling, literately or virtually, in a certain way. They then follow substantive rationality in the reduced problem by optimizing a given a belief over the partition.
Our approach thus retains the tight system of axioms that have dominated classical economics but also consider the actual processes of cognitions that have prevailed in psychology.
B. Future Research and Conclusion
Li (2017) points out that it is often difficult to find an ODS implementation when the allocation rule is implementable by a DS mechanism. Can we still come up with better implementation in such cases? In other words, could we find a mechanism that works for POP with coarser partitions? We have already shown in this paper, by examples, that such an improvement is possible. We leave those for future 39 Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) only consider the coarsest partition. In their model, decision makers first associate one outcome with one action, by sampling and then choosing the one that has the best outcome.
research to characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions needed for implementation in partition dominant strategies.
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In this paper, we discuss partitions over subjective state-space as it is given exogenously. It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose a general theory that accounts for the formation of partitions. 41 Clearly, more work is needed to analyze such dynamics.
